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Introduction  
 
The status-seeking, or keeping up with the Joneses, motive has received considerable 
attention in the literature on consumers‟ behaviour in recent years. It is the idea that what 
motivates consumers is not only appreciation of individual consumption per se, but also their 
relative position with respect to the others‟ level of consumption, possible underlying causes 
being ambition, envy, greed or a sense of achievement, status and identity or similar powerful 
motives of human behaviour.
i
 In macroeconomics, such arguments seem to be gaining 
ground. Among the examples is Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) which investigates the effects of 
this specification for tax policy; Jung (2004) which investigates business cycle dynamics 
under this feature and sticky prices; and Dixon (2000), which shows that aspiring to earn the 
long-run rate of profit (a form of keeping up with the Joneses) is likely to lead to collusion as 
the only viable strategy. Along with the evolution of (endogenous) habits, social comparisons 
and status-seeking in utility may be among the primary explanations of the Easterlin paradox 
whereby happiness increases only sluggishly in the face of big increases in income (see e.g. 
Easterlin, 2001; Clark et al., 2008). Closer to the aims of this paper, implications for growth 
have been highlighted, among others, by Futagami and Shibata (1998), Corneo and Jeanne 
(1997, 2001), Carroll, Overland and Weil (1997), Tournemaine (2008), Tournemaine and 
Tsoukis (2008). Alonso-Carrera, Caballé and Raurich (2004) and Alvarez-Cuadrado, 
Monteiro and Turnovsky (2004) draw implications for macroeconomic dynamics.
ii
 
 
As the wide-ranging reviews of Frey and Stutzer (2002, p. 411-2) and Clark et al. (2008, sub-
Sections 1, 3.1 and 3.2) show, the concern over social comparisons in individual decision 
making is a long-established line of inquiry, indeed a conclusion, across a variety of social 
disciplines and sub-disciplines, including economics and happiness-related research. More 
specifically, evidence of relative income and status in the utility (or happiness function) 
appears in social psychology, neurological and physiological studies, and experimental 
economics. In social psychology, where such concerns date to at least as far back as Festinger 
(1954), such concerns are obvious in the textbook expositions of Brewer and Crano (1994, 
Chapter 11) and Aronson et al. (1994, Chapter 9). In economics, the idea of status and social 
comparisons in income in utility function also go back quite a long way. A variety of studies 
reported in Clark et al (2008, section 3.2) have related subjective (self-reported) measure of 
happiness to absolute and relative income. They show a fairly strong negative influence of 
comparison income on happiness, on occasion to the point that individual income enters only 
via the relative income regressor and not independently (as absolute income).
iii 
 
Sampling among relatively recent literature, we may note Clark and Oswald (1996) which 
concludes that workers‟ job satisfaction are negatively related to their comparison earnings 
levels. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Maurer and Meier (2008), McBride (2001) and Senik 
(2007) all confirm the importance of reference income as a determinant of subjective measure 
of well-being, or happiness. So, one cannot but conclude with Frey and Stutzer (2002), p. 
412: There is little doubt that people compare themselves to other people and do not use 
absolute judgements.
iv,
 
v
 But of course, many details need to be filled by empirical work. As 
Frey and Stutzer themselves go on to note, it is crucial to know with what other people such a 
comparison is being made (see e.g. Senik, 2007). Furthermore, there is rather little concrete 
empirical information on the exact magnitudes of elasticities, the curvature of the status sub-
utility, and about the effect of distribution on happiness and fairness considerations (see 
Kahneman et al., 1986). We shall come back to the last two of these points below.
vi
  
 
The notion of status-seeking, or social comparisons in utility, may be appealing as a possible 
explanation of a number of recent findings in macroeconomics. As documented in some detail 
in Section 2 below, recent research has provided evidence of rising income inequality in some 
industrial economies, notably the US, shifting balance in the labour and capital income 
shares, and differing across the Atlantic, but also increasing, labour supply. Keeping up and 
status motives may potentially go some way towards providing an answer as they alter the 
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motives and therefore the behaviour of individuals. For instance, higher such incentives may 
motivate individuals to work harder. By being the source of heterogeneity, and by interacting 
with other sources of heterogeneity, such motives may thereby alter income distribution. 
Furthermore, by changing the supply of labour and thereby the productivity of capital, such 
behaviour may also have implications for factor shares. There do not generally seem to exist 
widely accepted explanations for the stylised facts mentioned above. So, the addition of 
cultural and behavioural elements like status motives (paralleling the cultural differences 
across the Atlantic proposed by Blanchard, 2004) into the list of (not necessarily mutually 
exclusive) possible causes and their analysis is worthwhile.  
 
Accordingly, this paper has a twofold aim: Firstly, to review in some detail recent evidence 
on income inequality, labour supply and factor shares in industrialised economies. Arguably, 
there is now a set of stylised facts that must be considered by, and inform, macroeconomic 
research. The second aim is to incorporate status-seeking into a standard macro model and 
obtain a number of (what can be called) stylised predictions, i.e. some key effects of such a 
motive. This canonical model (to use the label, and a variant of the model, introduced by 
Garcia-Penalosa and Turnovsky, 2005) features a basic model of endogenous growth coupled 
with agent heterogeneity and hence distributional considerations. While growth has long been 
recognised as a key feature of the macroeconomy, particularly when cross-country 
comparisons are involved, the literature mentioned above makes the big point that distribution 
should also be a second key feature.
vii
 While admittedly very schematic, such a canonical 
model can potentially be a useful organising framework for the understanding of the 
seemingly disparate reported empirical observations. It can also form the basis from which 
such status considerations can be introduced into more complex and realistic models. 
Therefore, our particular aim is to provide a qualitative initial analysis of the question, to what 
extent can the model‟s stylised predictions go in meeting the reported stylised findings? The 
idea here is to see whether cross-country or inter-temporal variations in the status motive can 
potentially deliver the observed patterns in the variables in question. For a better perspective, 
other potential factors such as productivity differences, monopoly power arising from labour 
market imperfections or taxes are also included and their effects compared to those of the 
status-seeking motive. Thus, the added value of this paper is to re-affirm the importance of 
issues hitherto rather peripheral to main macroeconomic research, and to introduce status into 
a standard macro model as an organising framework and working hypothesis to understand 
them. It must be emphasised that the conclusions are qualitative, as the paper is rather 
exploratory in nature.  
 
While the literature so far has by and large considered a standard specification for keeping up 
with the Joneses, social comparisons in consumption, or status motives (we use the terms 
interchangeably, with more emphasis on the last one), some previous work, including our 
own, has highlighted the fact that there is a variety of arguments to consider and avenues to 
pursue in formalisation. For instance, Tsoukis (2007) and Bilancini and Boncinelli (2008) 
show the non-equivalence of mean- versus rank-based social comparisons. Tournemaine and 
Tsoukis (2010) introduce the average versus differential status effects distinction and also 
introduce heterogeneity among agents in the status motive. These arguments are briefly 
reviewed below (sub-Section 3.1) before being introduced into the model. But a key point is 
that, in the absence of much guidance from empirical work, one should keep an open mind in 
considering these effects.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant findings mentioned above 
in more detail. Section 3 introduces status into the basic model and derives the basic 
optimality conditions. Section 4 analyses a core model in the steady state (the focal point of 
the paper), while Section 5 derives further results. Section 6 concludes.  
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1. Some stylised facts in social/behavioural macroeconomics 
 
This Section briefly reviews various themes in macroeconomics of a broad social concern, 
together with some relevant evidence.  
 
2.1: Income distribution 
Piketty and Saez (2006) provide some very interesting information on income inequality in 
the US. The broad picture seems to be that inequality fell in the first few decades after WWII 
from its high pre-war levels (what has been termed the great compression, see Krugman, 
2007, for references and discussion), but seems to be rising lately. There is a fractal quality in 
the increase in inequality (a term that is also due to Krugman) in that the higher individuals 
are in the distribution, the more their income has increased: The income share of the top 
decile in US fell from about 45% pre-war to about 32% during 1940-85. It shows an 
increasing tendency post-85 (about 40% in 2000). The income share of top 1% incomes was 
about 8% in the 1960s and 70s, but about 15% in 2000. (However, the top 1% wealth share 
seems constant, if not declining.) The top 0.1% income share was about 7% in 2000, up from 
2% 30 years earlier. These tendencies in the US are mirrored by the UK and Canada, but not 
continental Europe or Japan, (e.g. in the behaviour of top 0.1% income share, which appears 
more stable).  
 
The same picture is corroborated by the data and historical analysis for the US presented in 
Levy and Temin (2007). Their Figure 1, replicated below, shows (square line – left scale) the 
ratio of annual earnings (including fringe benefits) of the median worker divided by a 
standard labor productivity measure – roughly speaking, a measure of the (marginal) share of 
total output per worker that the median full-time worker captures in compensation. The 
diamond line, below, (right scale) shows the Piketty-Saez (2003) estimate of the 99.5th 
income percentile on federal tax returns – the median income of the top 1 percent of reported 
incomes. The almost continuous, but accelerated from about 1980, decline in median worker 
incomes is remarkable, together with the startling rise in magnitude of the top incomes at 
about the same time. A similar picture emerges in Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005), who show 
(among other things) that the ratio of the top percentiles/deciles of income relative to the 10
th
 
decile have increasingly diverged since the 1970s. If we denote by Px the income of the 
cohort above the lowest x% (starting from the bottom), so that for instance P99 is the income 
of the 100
th
 (top) percentile, then obviously the following inequalities apply: 
P99.9/P10>P99/P10>P90/P10, but the distance between these ratios has been continuously 
rising in the last 25 years– see Figure 7 in Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005).  
 
As the comprehensive survey of Dew-Becker and Gordon (2007) shows, explanations for this 
rise in inequality vary, from attribution to globalisation and immigration, to skills-biased 
technical progress (see Autor et al., 2006), to a shift in institutions such as policies and the 
more general political climate that has changed considerably in the US since about 1980 
(Levy and Temin, 2007; echoed in more public discourse, e.g. Krugman, 2007). In particular, 
the skills-biased technical progress thesis, so prominent a few years ago, has now receded, 
partly because there is a lot of highly educated and skilled members of the workforce that 
have not enjoyed such increases in wages, and partly because the rising wages inequality 
coincides with a rise in entrepreneurial incomes and the capital share more generally (Levy 
and Temin, 2007, Appendix; see also Section 2.2. below). But it is fairly safe to say that we 
are far from a consensus. Shifting attitudes and more broadly social norms, may have played a 
role in this context. The present paper can be seen as a first step to investigate a subset of such 
cultural factors, namely the effect of potential differences in status motives.  
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Figure 1: Alternative measures of income inequality in the US 
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Replicated from Levy and Temin (2007, Figure 1). Blue line – left scale: The income of the median 
full-time worker divided by productivity, compiled by Levy and Temin (2007). Red line – right scale is 
the median income of the top 1% of reported incomes, following Picketty and Saez (2003), and the 
updated estimates available on Saez‟ website: http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/   
 
 
A statistic often used to describe income inequality is the Gini Index; it ranges from 0 (total 
equality) to 1 (one person owns the entire economy), so that the higher the number, the higher 
is inequality. Summary data from the OECD for selected industrial countries for the last 30 
years or so is shown in Table 2 below: The index seems to have increased but not uniformly; 
other data from the same source (not shown) shows if anything a broad tendency for the index 
to increase for most countries. Finally, Krugman (2007, Chapter 7) argues that whilst between 
1973 and 2006 there had been a net, usable productivity growth of the order of 35%, the 
overall fortunes of the typical, median American family were hardly any better at the end of 
the period compared to the beginning. So, rising income inequality in the last 20 years in 
some parts at least of the industrialised west, notably in the US, seems to be an emerging fact, 
even if the precise details are yet to be determined.   
 
 
Table 1: Gini coefficient – selected countries 
 
    
mid-70s 
 
mid-80s 
 
around 1990 
 
mid-90s 
 
around 2000 
 
mid-2000s 
 
France 
    
0.31 
 
0.3 
 
0.28 
 
0.28 
 
0.28 
 
Germany 
    
0.26 
 
0.26 
 
0.27 
 
0.27 
 
0.3 
 
Japan 
    
0.3 
  
0.32 
 
0.34 
 
0.32 
 
United Kingdom 
  
0.28 
 
0.33 
 
0.37 
 
0.35 
 
0.37 
 
0.34 
 
United States 
  
0.32 
 
0.34 
 
0.35 
 
0.36 
 
0.36 
 
0.38 
Source: OECD 
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2.2: Factor shares 
Interest has also increased on the functional distribution of income, or the determinants of 
factor shares; an early empirical analysis being Blanchard (1997). Gollin (2002) documents 
cross-country variation in labour shares, which for most countries the values lie in the range 
of 0.65-0.80 (data from late 1980s – early 90s). Perhaps in line with generally rising income 
inequality, there appears to be some evidence of changes in factor shares. OECD data for the 
same sample of 5 countries is presented in Figure 2 below; it does appear to indicate a slow 
downward trend in the labour share. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show evidence for 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain in which the labour share of GDP went from the highs of 
around 0.67-0.78 around 1980 to about 0.60-0.65 in the late 1990s. However, this conclusion 
appears to be contested by Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005, p. 73) who note: 
Overall there seems to be little air of crisis in the data on labour‟s share. Especially 
when the labor component of proprietors‟ income is included, the share of labour in 
domestic income has floated up and down over the decades with no clear trend.  
But, their Figure 2 does show something that could be interpreted as a mild downward 
tendency in the labour share since 1980 from a peak of more than 0.76 to about 0.72 in 2005, 
though the picture is mixed because the long-run trend (if any) is confounded with 
movements at other frequencies. In other words, as with the overall inequality mentioned 
above, we are beginning to see some signs of such trends, but one cannot as yet affirm 
categorically their precise nature.  
 
 
Figure 2: Labour shares – selected countries 
 
Source: OECD  
 
 
2.3: Work-life balance 
Another emerging stylised fact is the 24/7 lifestyle, societies that move and work ever faster 
and harder (Choudhary and Levine, 2006; Hamermesh and Slemrod, 2008).
viii
 In this respect, 
we may note the finding by Alesina et al. (2005) that the US is more work-prone than Europe. 
Specifically, the total hours of work per week per person are for the US 25.13, for France 
17.95, for Germany 18.68, and for Italy 16.68. They attribute this considerable difference 
between the US and Europe to differences in employment regulation and in the rate of 
unionisation across the two sides of the Atlantic; whereas Prescott (2004) attributes this 
entirely to differences in the marginal tax rates. Blanchard (2004) attributes these differences 
to differences in preferences and argues that gains in productivity are more likely to be 
translated into leisure in Europe than in the US. One thing implied by Blanchard, and verified 
by the data, is that there is no notable difference in growth rates across the two sides of the 
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Atlantic. The finding of increasing hours of work, of differences in this respect across the 
Atlantic, and the lack of difference in terms of growth rates will be key points in our analysis 
below. They will be seen to have strong implications about the possible differences in 
exogenous fundamentals that cause such stylised facts.  
 
2.4: The growth-inequality relationship 
There is a long-running debate on efficiency versus equity, or growth vs. (in)equality. 
Aghion, Caroli and García-Peñalosa (1999) present a review of a variety of theoretical 
arguments. Among more recent contributions, Corneo and Jeanne (2001) and Tournemaine 
and Tsoukis (2010) find that equality promotes growth, whereas, in an overlapping-
generations model with status effects, Hopkins and Kornienko (2006) argue that the 
relationship depends on the relative pursuit of status by the young and old. To give a flavour 
of the empirical results, Perotti (1996), and Persson and Tabellini (1994) present cross-
country evidence of a negative effect of inequality on growth. In contrast, using a panel of 
U.S. states, Partridge (1997) concludes that greater inequality is associated with greater 
growth. Other studies, finally, conclude that changes in income and changes in inequality are 
unrelated (Deninger and Squire, 1996; Chen and Ravallion, 1997). It is probably fair to say 
that, as yet, there seems to be little sign of consensus either at theoretical or empirical levels 
on this relationship. Once again, the role of differences in status-seeking motivation, and of 
other cultural differences more generally, can be fruitfully analysed.  
2.5 Summary: Stylised facts 
 
Even though much more information is required in order for the following to be described 
fully, and even though they will continue to be re-evaluated along the way, one may argue 
that we now have enough information to highlight the following three empirical findings and 
to classify them as stylised facts to be met by the basic macro models: 
 
a) Rising income inequality, probably more so in the US (and the UK) rather in 
(continental) Europe; 
b) A 24/7 work-life balance that produces more labour supply in the US than in Europe, 
without however the growth differences being correspondingly great; 
c) Factor shares that seem to be slowly tilting towards capital. 
 
There seems to be rather little by way of explaining these developments. The argument of this 
paper is that the status motive may play a key role in shaping these developments, as it 
induces a greater labour supply, hence it causes growth differences to be exacerbated, and 
also causes a fall in the marginal product of labour and labour remuneration. The rest of the 
paper is an exploration into the status motivation alongside some other factors that appear as 
candidates for explanation.  
 
 
2. The model 
 
3.1: Technology, preferences and relative standing 
 
We postulate an economy in discrete time that goes from zero to infinity. There is a unit mass 
[0, 1] of infinitely-lived individuals denoted by i who are also producers. The unit mass 
allows us to simplify things by equating aggregate and average values. Each individual is 
initially endowed with Ki,0>0 units of capital (wealth) at date zero and one unit of labour-time 
allocated to leisure and working activities. She produces an output, Yi,t, which can be 
consumed, Ci,t, or invested to give new units of capital, Ki,t. Each individual benefits from the 
production technology: 
 
 

titititi LKKAY ,
1
,,
   , 0<<1.      (1) 
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Apart from private capital, tiK , , and labour, tiL , , there are two different components of 
productivity. The first is agent-specific: Ai>0 is an index of individual skill, exogenously 
given. It is assumed that Ai is log-normally distributed across individuals with mean  and 
variance 
2
a . Defining i  logAi, we have i ~ N(,
2
a ) in a time-invariant fashion. Second, 
productivity is promoted by a learning-by-investing externality of aggregate activity, common 
across agents; this is a standard idea in the endogenous growth literature. As a convenient 
specification, productivity depends on the per capita (mean) amount of capital, Kt (as in 
Bertola, 1993). The resulting AK type of technology combines a number of desirable features, 
namely diminishing returns to private capital, but constant returns to aggregate capital 
guaranteeing endogenous growth.  
 
Individuals derive utility from their level of consumption, leisure and their social status. 
Formally, consumer i‟s instantaneous utility function is: 
 
   


 
0
,,,, ),(loglog)1(
t
tittiti
t
ti LCCfCU  ,   (2) 
 
where  is the subjective discount rate (common across agents), β>0 is a measure of the 
marginal disutility of work, Li,t is the amount of labour-time allocated to working activities 
(i.e. output production) and )(f  captures the status motive (or Joneses effect) in 
consumption. Apart from individual consumption (subscripted i), its level also matters 
relative to reference consumption taken to be the average in the economy (denoted with over-
bar: tC ). The functional form that such social comparisons should take is not entirely 
clearcut. Early specifications (Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Gali, 1994; Ljungqvist and 
Uhlig, 2000) suggested that )(f  should depend solely on the distance of individual 
consumption from the mean.
ix
 An increasingly influential strand (e.g., Abel, 1990) suggest 
considering comparisons in a ratio form. Yet a third, minority, literature (Hopkins and 
Kornienko, 2004; Corneo and Jeanne, 2001) has argued that it is the rank of individuals 
within the social hierarchy (i.e., the consumption distribution) that matters, whatever the basic 
underlying motive is. In this light, the distance (in absolute or percentage terms) from the 
mean does not capture all necessary information, as rank depends also on the nature of the 
distribution. Here, we follow the second strand and assume the )(f  function to depend on 
relative consumption, or ratio of individual to reference (here: mean) consumption. To 
maintain intuition, we shall sometimes refer to )(f  as the relative standing function.  
 
Our main analytical innovation relates to the elasticity of the relative standing function )(f  
with respect to the relative standing tti
C
ti CCX /,,  . Following Tsoukis (2007), Tournemaine 
and Tsoukis (2010), we postulate a convenient form of this elasticity, that we denote by ti , :  
 
 )(
)(
)(
,2,10
,
,
,
C
ti
C
ti
i
C
ti
C
ti
ti xVarx
f
X
X
f
 


 .     (3)
  
 
A number of ideas are incorporated here. Firstly, we have the distinction introduced in 
Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2010) between average and differential status effects. Average 
status motivation (
i
0 ) is taken to be that portion of the elasticity that does not depend on the 
relative standing of the agent. In contrast, the differential effect captured by the term tix ,1  
 8 
does depend on the relative position of the individual as we define: 
C
ti
C
ti Xx ,, log . 
Furthermore, there is more to be said about both these parts of the elasticity. The average 
effect is taken to be agent-specific (via the i-superscript) so as to capture idiosyncratic 
motivation (e.g., some people are more driven than others because of status considerations). 
This introduces another source of heterogeneity in the model, in addition to skills 
heterogeneity. This allows us to capture the idea that agents may be more or less driven either 
because of genuine ability (skills), or status-related motivation. In reality, these two sources 
of heterogeneity may be expected to be positively correlated, but a case can be made that they 
are conceptually distinct, so we will treat them here as orthogonal. For convenience, we 
assume that 
i
0  is normally distributed across individuals with mean 0  and variance 
2
 : 
),(~ 200  N
i
). 
 
The differential effect regulates the curvature of the status function, )(f . We may 
distinguish between convexity of )(f  with respect to relative consumption (1>0); we call 
this gains from status– status increasing faster than relative position, or it pays to be a leader. 
Concavity is given by the opposite case, (1<0); we call this pains from loss of status– status 
being lost faster than relative position, or it is painful to lose out. This elasticity will be shown 
to be important below in the model‟s ability to qualitatively emulate the stylised facts. Despite 
this (potential) importance, there is no empirical evidence (to our knowledge) as to what case 
is more plausible. Clark and Oswald (1998) provide a pioneering (partial-equilibrium) 
analysis of the importance of this distinction; they show that concavity implies generally a 
follower‟s (or conformist‟s) behaviour, whereas convexity implies a deviant behaviour - the 
individual enjoys being different; they argue in favour of the concavity case. Perhaps the most 
compelling argument for signing 1 is the notion of loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1991). According to this notion, losses from a reference point are more highly valued than 
potential gains; hence, assuming that equality is a reference point (i.e. 
C
tiX , =1 for any i), 
moving upwards from it may be less important than moving downwards. Recent empirical 
evidence that supports the asymmetry of comparisons, like that of Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005; 
suggesting that comparisons are mostly made upwards) and Senik (2007; suggesting that 
unfavourable comparisons are more important than favourable ones), is in line with this 
hypothesis. All this body of literature, then, suggests that the )(f  function is concave 
(1<0), a baseline assumption we are going to make.
x
 
 
The term (2<1/2 introduces another effect, namely the effect on status of a greater variance in 
relative positions, 
C
tiX , . There is even less clear evidence on the sign of 2. We may reason 
that, in view of the fractal quality of the increasing income inequality (i.e., the increase of 
incomes in a percentile is greater the higher the percentile), a rise in variance is likely to mean 
in practice an unfavourable increase of the distance for the vast majority of individuals, so it 
is likely to demoralise them; in this respect, we should expect 20. Within this framework, it 
is interesting to note another difference across the Atlantic reported by Alesina, DiTella and 
MacCulloch (2004), namely that inequality negatively affects happiness in Europe but not in 
the US. Variation in 2 will be seen to affect various outcomes below.
xi
  
 
Thus, the postulated elasticity (3) is rich enough to capture a range of considerations, and 
broadly in line with the available empirical evidence.
xii
 It will play a crucial role in what 
follows, as our core analytical contribution is to introduce elasticity (3) into the canonical 
model of growth and distribution and investigate the effects of its various aspects, particularly 
in relation to the stylised facts reported above. Parameters 1 and 2 are common across 
agents; heterogeneity is generated by idiocyncratic average status motivation (
i
0 ) and 
idiocyncratic productivity, iA .  
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Finally, the literature has pointed out a potential effect of growth (g) on relative standing and 
status via its effect on reference consumption tC  (Gali, 1994; Abel, 1990). This may be the 
current mean, or the past mean. In the latter case, we have a variant assumption termed 
catching up with the Joneses; the idea is that it takes time for agents to form a clear view of 
the reference to which they ought to compare themselves. In this case, as consumption grows 
at the general growth rate in the steady state, the growth rate plays a positive role in 
enhancing status.
xiii
 If so, the differential status effect may be written as 1=(g), with 
‟(g)>0. In an Appendix, we briefly explore this possibility.  
 
3.2: The representative agent’s problem 
 
Individuals choose consumption, capital accumulation and labour devoted to output 
production that maximise intertemporal utility (2) subject to the technology constraint (1) and 
the sequence of resource constraints (in beginning-of-period notation and ignoring 
depreciation) given by: 
 
 titititi TCYK ,,,1, )1(    ,     (4) 
 
where  is the difference operator between two periods of time,  is a flat tax at rate levied 
and rebated as a lump-sum transfer, Ti,t. The introduction of this policy will allow us to 
determine in a clearcut manner which of the status effects or the tax rate replicate better the 
empirical regularities. 
 
For simplicity, and as it does not alter the behaviour of individuals, we assume that the lump-
sum rebate, tiT ,  is constant across individuals i: tti TT ,  for all i. Moreover, for reasons that 
will become clearer below, we assume that the rebate is indexed on average consumption (as 
opposed to the customary average output). Hence, by the unit mass and equality of aggregates 
and averages, the lump-sum rebate each individual gets equals a fraction  (to be definitised 
below) of average consumption.
xiv
 Under the assumption of a balanced government budget 
constraint, we thus have: 
 
 tt
i
t,i
i
t,i CTdiTdiY   .      (5) 
 
Note that the way the tax operates makes it redistributive, but also makes it a distortion 
without any supporting role for public services. This tax will allow us to consider the Prescott 
(2004) claim that the differences in labour supply across the Atlantic are due to tax 
differences; and Levy and Temin (2007) claim that public policy and taxation have affected 
inequality (for quite obvious reasons) in the US.  
 
The first order conditions of this problem with respect to consumption and capital, may be 
expressed as:  
 
 









 1
/)1)(1(1
/)1(
/)1( ,,
1,1,
,, titi
titi
titi KY
C
C
.    (6) 
 
(6) is the Euler equation; it equates the marginal rate of substitution with the marginal rate of 
transformation in consumption across dates t and t+1. Furthermore, from the first order 
conditions with respect to consumption and labour, we obtain: 
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Equation (7) equates the marginal utility of leisure to its opportunity cost, net of tax. Though 
the worker and firm are identical here (a yeoman farmer), we introduce a markup term () to 
capture product market imperfections. Specifically, 0 captures the monopolistic power of 
firms, with =0 being the polar case of perfect competition in the product market. Such 
monopoly power would decrease the real wage in relation to the marginal product of labour. 
The aim is to evaluate whether imperfections in the product markets, but also more generally 
their structure and/or regulation, may be responsible for the observed facts, particularly labour 
shares (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) and/or working hours.
xv
 On the other hand, labour 
market imperfections such as trade unions or labour market regulation are captured by , not 
by .xvi Thus, a rise in monopoly power in favour of the worker (say, via unionisation) would 
be equivalent, ceteris paribus, to a higher disutility of labour (and implicitly the reservation 
wage) and a higher real wage and marginal product of labour. It is worth noting that the status 
motive works in the same way as, but in the opposite direction than, both the firm and the 
worker monopoly power in (7). It will be seen that status seeking is a rich source of shifts in 
(7), as it is affected by a number of factors (relative position, its variance, and the growth 
rate), and because it is idiosyncratic.  
 
 
3. A core system in the steady-state: Growth and labour supply  
 
In this Section, we develop a first core system in the (economy-wide) growth rate and labour, 
holding the relative position of agent i as exogenous. The aim is to investigate the effects in 
this model of the key exogenous institutional changes we consider, namely a rise in the status-
seeking motive (captured by the elasticity  and the parameters in 3), a rise in the tax rate (), 
in monopoly power (), and an exogenous rise in productivity or technology ().  
 
In the steady state, on which the rest of this paper focuses, all distributions (of consumption, 
capital, labour and output) are invariant. Thus, for convenience, time subscripts are dropped. 
Moreover, the consumption and output growth rates (to be indicated by g) are common across 
farms; if not, somebody would eventually end up owning the whole economy. In this context, 
in the steady-state, equation (6) reads:  
 
 





1
/)1)(1(1
1 ii
KY
g . 
 
Log-linearising and approximating in the standard way, we obtain:  
 
   rg )1( ,       (8) 
 
where r is defined from the Cobb-Douglas technology (1) as: 
 
 ii KYr /)1(         (9) 
 
One point worth noting about the Keynes-Ramsey rule of consumption growth (6) is that i is 
in general time-varying, giving scope for short-run dynamics even in an AK model, a point 
noted by Alonso–Carrera et al. (2004). Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) investigate in detail 
the dynamics outside the steady state and note that they are driven by a status effect 
(comparison of individual consumption with C  in our terminology), as well as the rate of 
return. In the steady state, however, with time-invariant relative consumption distribution and 
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growth, our specification (3) yields a constant status elasticity in the steady state, so that 
steady-state growth (8) takes the standard form. But growth is still affected by status: As will 
be seen below, this effect will arise because status considerations impinge on labour supply 
and the real interest rate.
xvii
 Note that a common growth rate also implies (by 8 and 9) a 
common real interest rate and output-to-capital ratio across firms. 
 
From equation (7), we obtain: 
 
 
i
ii
i
C
Y
L

 )1()1)(1( 
      (10) 
 
Note that if there is no disutility of labour (if  tends to zero), we obtain a corner solution, 
whereby individuals allocate their entire labour time to output production: Li=1 for all i.  
 
The next key equation is established from the resource constraint (4). Since the consumption-
output ratio is constant in the steady state and common across agents (see equation (8)), the 
budget constraint (4) with the balanced government budget (5) implies: 
 
 CgKYC iii   )1(  ,  i      (11) 
 
where we recall that the un-subscripted consumption refers to the aggregate/average. 
However,  is not a parameter, but one that should be consistent with the aggregate resource 
constraint. The government budget constraint (5) (aggregated) yields CY   . The 
aggregate resource constraint, on the other hand, is given by: Y=C+gK (since there are no 
government expenditures). Combining these two, together with the Euler equation (8) and the 
real interest rate (9), we get:  
 
 
YK /)1( 



 .      (12) 
 
 
We note that <<1 and that  
 
 
1
/)1(
/
0
2







YK
YK




.  
 
This assumes that the effect of the tax rate on this ratio via the capital-output ratio is, to a first 
approximation, zero (it can be seen that this effect will be proportional to (1-
)/denominator2).  For future use, we note that a conservative value for  would arise from 
the customary labour elasticity in production of =0.65, a state sector of about =0.3 (1-
=0.7) (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000), a rate of time preference of =0.02 and a capital-output 
ratio K/Y=3 (see P. Romer, 1989). Therefore, we have a likely =0.375. Variations in terms 
of these parameters may produce slightly different values for . 
 
Combining (11) with (8) and (9) yields:  
 
 )/)(/()1(// iiiiiii YCCCYKYC    ,   (13) 
 
As Bertola (1993) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) have made clear, the individual consumes 
their entire labour income plus a fraction  of their financial assets (capital). Here, labour 
income is implicitly given by the marginal product of labour times labour: Yi. This basic 
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distinction is adjusted for the redistributive effects of taxation. This is strongest naturally for 
those lower down the distribution (low CCX i
C
i / ) and enhances the consumption 
obtainable otherwise.  
 
From (8) and (9), we may write )]1)(1/[()(/   gKY ii ; as mentioned, this 
quantity is constant across firms in the steady state. Using this into (13) and further into the 
labour supply (10), we obtain an alternative form of the labour supply as follows: 
 
 




)1(
)/1()1)(1(



G
XG
L
C
ii
i ,     (14) 
 
where  gG  may be called the gross growth rate (which from (9) is also seen to be 
equal to the after-tax real interest rate, but its interpretation as a growth-related quantity is 
more useful here). Equation (14) shows that a necessary condition to avoid a corner solution 
(i.e. zero labour supply) requires 1X/ Ci  , i, which we assume to be satisfied. The 
CCX i
C
i /  distribution needs to be compressed accordingly; this requires individuals to be 
heterogeneous but close enough to each other in terms of skills, and idiosyncratic status. 
 
Note that, the tax rate does not affect labour supply directly, but it does through growth and 
the θ-redistribution parameter. 
 
Using (9) and the production function (1), the growth equation (8) may be re-written as:  
 
 i
K
ii LXAG
 )()1)(1( ,     (15) 
 
where G is gross growth rate (  gG ) and we have denoted: KKX i
K
i / .  
 
Holding at this stage the relative positions 
C
iX  and 
K
iX  as exogenous (i.e., for a given agent 
i), equations (14 – labour supply) and (15 – gross growth rate) form a system in (G, Li) that is 
at the core of the model. To aid intuition, we depict it graphically (Figure 3). 
 
From (14) and (15), both schedules are readily checked to be monotonically increasing, 
however (14) is convex while (15) concave. In particular, growth depends positively on 
labour, but the slope becomes flatter because of diminishing returns. Labour supply depends 
positively on growth as this increases the output-consumption ratio in a convex way, which in 
turn decreases the ratio of marginal disutility of labour to the marginal product of labour. As a 
result, the labour supply locus is convex.    
 
Changes in the institutional factors we are considering in this paper shift the schedules in the 
way shown in Figure 3. Productivity shifts the growth schedule;
xviii
 it does not affect the 
labour supply as hours of work cannot trend in the steady state (unlike productivity – see e.g. 
King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). A rise in productivity moves the equilibrium from A to C: 
both growth and the labour supply increase, but the impact on growth is greater. An 
intensification of the status-seeking motive, on the other hand, affects directly labour supply, 
and then affects growth in the same direction, but by less because of diminishing marginal 
returns (A to B). An increase in taxes shifts on the growth schedule downwards, decreasing 
both growth and labour supply (C to A), but more growth than labour supply. Finally, both 
increases in both types of market imperfections, in particular firm‟s monopoly power in the 
product market (), and workers‟ monopoly power in the labour market (), shift the labour 
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supply inwards (i.e., they both reduce labour supply given the rate of growth, the opposite 
effect of an increase in status), with a decline in hours more than growth.  
 
 
Figure 3: Growth and individual-i labour supply 
 
 
 
 
 
While these changes move the economies between points A and B consistently with the 
evidence, one of them is incompatible with the specifics. Europe is usually associated with 
more workers‟ power (via trade unions, see, e.g., Nickell, 1997), i.e. a higher , which would 
indeed push her to occupy A. With a higher labour supply, the US is schematically at B. For 
this to happen, it must have either lower firm monopoly power, or lower worker power, or 
both. While the US may plausibly be associated with a lower worker power (through a lower 
degree of unionisation), it may also plausibly be considered to have a higher firm power 
(through its industrial conglomerates), i.e. a higher ; but this is inconsistent with it 
occupying point B. On the other hand, variation in status motives may be compatible with the 
evidence, if the US is thought to be more motivated by status (through the pursuit of  the 
American dream). If so, status considerations appear to work in the right direction, in the 
sense that they are consistent with the evidence. Labour market imperfections appear to be a 
contender to status in explaining the noted regularities concerning growth and labour supply; 
but product market imperfections produce counterintuitive results.  
 
We are therefore in a position to establish formally some intermediate results: 
 
Proposition 1: Effects on labour supply and growth: 
Given the relative position of the individual, CCX i
C
i / , (equal in the steady state to the 
relative position in terms of capital). 
G
Li
A
B
C
Labour supply (14)
Product.  up, tax down
Growth (15)
Status up, markup/tax down
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(a) A rise in the intensity of status-seeking motive raises both growth and labour supply, but 
the latter more.  
(b) A rise in productivity also raises both variables, but the balance between the two effects is 
the opposite than in (a).  
(c) A rise in the (flat) rate of tax reduces both variables, with a higher effect on growth. 
(d) A rise in both product and labour market imperfections reduces both variables, but the 
relative magnitudes vary.  
 
Proof:  
Easily verified from total differentiation of (14) and (15). Notes are available on request.  
 
These results are interesting because they raise the possibility that, among the four types of 
exogenous development considered here, possible differences in attitudes to status and in 
labour market imperfections across time and/or countries seem to hold most promise in 
explaining empirical regularity (b) reported in sub-Section 2.5.  
 
We now proceed to examine the relevance of these factors for stylised facts (a) and (c). 
 
 
4. A system in growth and distribution (variance) 
 
The growth-labour supply system derived above (equations 14-15) was cast in terms of 
individual variables. The aim of this Section is to develop a counterpart system in growth, 
variance of (relative) consumption and mean labour supply. In doing so, we shall see that 
mean growth is affected by the variance, through the status elasticity (). Furthermore, by (3), 
the variance of consumption is a function of growth itself. Thus, a 2x2 system emerges in this 
Section in growth and variance of relative consumption. We discuss each equation in turn, 
before proceeding in the next Section, to derive the reduced form of the system, at which 
point we shall also discuss labour supply. Thus, this Section is an intermediate one, discussed 
at some length for more intuition.  
 
Introducing labour supply (14) into growth (15), we get the following expression for the gross 
growth rate  gG : 
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or 
 
   )/1)(1()()1)(1(~ CiiKii XXAG   ,   (16) 
 
where we have used the shorthand expressions    )1(
~ 1   GGG , and 
 /)1(  . 
 
In order to proceed, we invoke an intermediate result, which is of some interest in itself. The 
result concerns the relationship between the consumption and capital distributions in the 
steady state. To begin, rewrite (13) as CYKC iii   )1( , and divide by the mean 
consumption, to get: 
 
    )/(/)1( CKKYXX ii
K
i
C
i      
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At the same time, we can aggregate the above, to get: 
 
   )1/()1(   YKC  
 
Or 
 
   )1/(/)1(/   KYKC   
 
Combining with the previous, we have: 
 
  )1(Ki
C
i XX        (17) 
 
This is so because the output-private capital ratio is common across agents, and therefore 
across the aggregate, as it is proportional to the common real interest rate (see 9). Conditional 
on the consumption distribution, driven by exogenous skills and status motive heterogeneity, 
the above equation (17) endogenises the wealth distribution.  
 
Raising to power 1/ and re-arranging, we can write (16) as: 
 
   )1()1(~)1()/( /11 iiCiCiKi AGXXX 

    (16‟)  
 
Using (17), this is simplified as: 
 
   )1()1(~)1()1/( /11 iiKi AGX 

     (16‟‟) 
 
or 
 
   )1()1)(1(~)1/( /11 iiCi AGX 

     (16‟‟‟) 
 
From this, it immediately follows that the variances of consumption and wealth are related by: 
 
)()1()( 2 Ki
C
i XVarXVar         
 
VarX
K  ≥ VarXC, with the difference increasing with redistribution. This is in line with 
empirical evidence that the variance of wealth is greater than the variance of income.  
 
We now take logs of (17), using log(1+i)i and (3), to get: 
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Taking variances, we readily get:  
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This equation reaffirms the two exogenous, and orthogonal, drivers of heterogeneity in 
consumption, namely the skills (Ai) and status motivation (
0
i ) heterogeneity. The variance 
of consumption increases in the variances of both. The key insight offered by (18), however, 
is related to the role of differential status motivation, 1. The variance of consumption rises 
exponentially with this parameter. Thus, a marginal increase from the benchmark value of 
zero will produce more variance of consumption if this is going towards gains (1>0) than if 
going towards pains (1<0). The following proposition recapitulates: 
 
Proposition 2: On inequality: 
(a) Inequality rises with both skills and exogenous status-motivated inequality. 
(b) Gains from status increase the variance as the motivated (by ability or ambition) 
individuals also work harder; pains mitigates the variance, as it motivates individuals not 
to be left behind;  
(c) Redistributive taxation does not affect the variance of log-consumption, but is important 
for  the distribution of consumption in levels;  
(d) Likewise, the monopoly power of unions or firms is irrelevant for the distribution of log-
consumption.  
 
Proof:  All clauses follow from (18).        
 
Rather counterintuitively, neither redistributive taxation nor monopoly power (either form 
union or firm), affect the variance of log-consumption. This is due to the scaling in taking 
logs, whereby all multiplicative terms become additive constants, and hence do not affect the 
variance. In contrast, the variance of relative consumption in levels (not logs) will in general 
be affected by both redistribution and monopoly power of firms and workers. To see this, we 
need to go back to (16‟‟‟) and write 1+iexp{i} and then take variances, to get: 
 
    )1/(120)1/(2
))1(/(21 111 )}(exp{)/(()1)(1(
~
)(
 
  Ciii
C
i xVarAVarGXVar  
 
Given the variance of log consumption from (19), this makes clear that the variance of the 
level is a complex function of the exogenous variances and taxation/redistribution (both of 
which lower the variance), and monopoly power of both unions and firms (implicit in B, both 
of which also decrease the variance).  
 
Finally, we develop an expression for growth. Taking (18) again, reverting to levels, taking 
means (noting that EXi=1 by assumption), and re-arranging, we get: 
 
  )(log)/1()1)(1(~log)/1()1log()1( 2011 CiCi xVarGEx     
 
Using the fact that 1=E(X)=exp{Ex+Var(x)/2}, which is accurate in the case of log-normality, 
otherwise an approximation, we have, Ex = -Var(x)/2, therefore: 
 
  )()2/2/1(log)/1()1)(1(~log)/1()1log( 2101 CixVarG   
 
And from this: 
 
   )2/)()21(exp)()1)(1()1(~ 210 CixVaraG      (20) 
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Mean skills and status motivations (+0) fuel growth. The interesting feature here is that 
taxation (both in its distortionary role and through redistribution) decreases growth as they 
decrease the mean marginal product of capital. Furthermore, the variance of (log) 
consumption has an ambiguous effect on growth, depending on the differential status 
motivation parameter and the effect of variance on status. If pains exist (1<0, and are strong 
enough to offset the demoralising effect of a higher variance, so that -1+22>0), then a 
higher variance elicits a higher average labour supply as a greater mass of individuals make a 
higher effort in order not to be left behind. Thus, as far as status considerations are concerned, 
a growth-equality trade-off emerges. However, the overall picture is unclear at least for two 
reasons: Firstly, because of redistribution which elicits the opposite relation (it decreases both 
the variance and growth). Secondly, though pains (1<0) is the more plausible case in view of 
the evidence discussed above, it is at least theoretically possible for gains to prevail (1>0), in 
which case labour supply falls with higher variance because the latter implies a smaller mass 
of leaders who are motivated to work harder (given the right-skewness of the income 
distribution). Thus, just a simple statement on any trade-off may be misleading, as both 
growth and variance are endogenous variables, and how they change depends crucially on the 
shocks that hit the system.  
 
The get the full picture, we develop the final reduced form of growth. Introducing variance (19) 
into growth (20), we get: 
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The same structure is essentially retained as in the semi-reduced form (20). Average 
productivity and status motivation are beneficial for growth, as expected. Redistribution 
unambiguously harms growth as it reduces the labour effort – see (16). As in (20), the 
differential status effect plays an important role. Formally, we can state: 
 
Proposition 3: Determinants of the aggregate growth rate. 
(a) Growth increases with mean exogenous productivity and status; 
(b) The effect of exogenous heterogeneity is ambiguous, depending on the sign of the 
differential status effect and the effect of variance on status (2);  
(c) The differential status effect affects growth positively in the case of pains and negatively 
in the case of gains; 
(d) Redistribution harms growth; 
(e) Both types of monopoly power decrease growth. 
 
Proof:  All clauses follow from (21).     
 
How does this all help explain the stylised facts of Section 2? Firstly, let us note that 
heterogeneity is made up of skills heterogeneity and also motivation (status-related) 
heterogeneity; both these two exogenous sources of variance affect both inequality but may 
also have implications for growth. Note in particular, that if pains is combined with a weak 
negative effect of variance in utility, as may well be plausible in view of the evidence, so that 
1+220, then exogenous heterogeneity affects the variance but not growth. Any variation of 
it, either in the cross-section or across time, may have stronger effects on inequality than on 
growth, which seems to be the evidence.   
 
Another interesting feature of variance (19) in particular, is the role of the differential status 
effect 1. Even in otherwise identical economies in terms of exogenous heterogeneity, how 
agents respond to it will affect all final outcomes, i.e. both the variance of consumption and 
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growth. Though the plausible case is 1<0 (pains), there is no presumption that this parameter 
will be equal across countries. We may envisage better reasons for this if we hypothesise that 
this parameter reflects an average in society, rather than a constant for all individuals. Thus, 
in economies where more individuals derive status-related satisfaction, e.g. by emphasis on a 
dream to be pursued, then |1| may be lower than elsewhere (while on average 1<0 in all 
societies). In societies more averse to individuals being left behind, though, |1| will be higher. 
Ceteris paribus, the latter societies will feature a lower variance (fewer individuals left 
behind) and higher growth (less leaders motivated to work harder). The relevance of these 
considerations is that any findings of greater inequality in the US and UK compared to 
continental Europe, or in recent times compared to earlier post-war decades, may be 
explained by appeal to status. This presumes, of course, that status-related motivation differs 
between countries and/or that it has changed across time. The analysis of this paper suggests 
that this is a line of argument worth exploring further.  
 
 
5. Factor shares 
 
Finally, we develop the factor shares in this framework. Strictly speaking, factor shares 
cannot be properly investigated here as they are exogenously fixed by the elasticities of the 
privately-owned factors in the Cobb-Douglas production function. But consumption shares 
(shares net of the expenditure on accumulation) are endogenous and the effect of status on 
these can be investigated. Referring back to consumption (13), we may write the ratio of total 
consumption over consumption derived from capital ownership only for any agent i as: 
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This quantity gives the inverse of the capital share in each individual's consumption - the 
inverse of the proportion of consumption that can be attributed to capital income. If we 
average this quantity over i, we get an idea about (the inverse of) the capital share. Taking 
expectations over i (affecting only the numerator), introducing C/K=(Y/K)(1-)-g from 
national income accounting, and using the economy-wide interest rate (9) and the 
consumption Euler equation (8), we get:  
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The first expectation in the numerator may be seen from the labour supply (14) and growth 
(16) to boil down to: 
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so that the above becomes:
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The second (approximate) equality uses an approximate equality of the variances of log-
consumption and log-capital based on their relation (17). This quantity unambiguously 
increases with growth but falls with the exogenous variance of (log) consumption. It is, 
therefore, affected by the various fundamentals in the same way as is growth. Since the 
consumption variance is exogenous, the ratio also increases with a rise in taxation and 
redistribution (introduced by  and ), so that the capital share falls with redistribution. The 
variance term at the end, similar to the variance term in growth, represents a Jensen inequality 
effect: At its root is the intensity of redistribution for the individual, which rises as the relative 
position falls. As variance rises, so do the tax receipts and the intensity of redistribution, and 
the capital share falls.  
 
Proposition 4: On (consumption) factor shares 
(a) The consumption capital share falls with growth;  
(b) It also falls with the intensity of redistribution and with variance, as in this case the effect 
of any redistribution mechanism in place becomes more pronounced. 
 
Proof: Straightforward observation of (22').      
 
From the point of view of reconciling the above with the evidence presented in Section 2, we 
should be seeing the capital share to be negatively (partially) correlated with growth, the 
intensity of redistribution, and variance of (log) consumption. It should by implication also be 
negatively related to labour supply, itself positively related to growth. In fact, the evidence 
reviewed may be interpreted to suggest that the capital share is positively correlated with 
labour supply (e.g., the US has more of each than Europe). This observed positive correlation 
between capital share and labour supply is an anomaly in relation to the above results. 
 
 
6. Labour supply 
 
Finally, we turn to a reduced form of the labour supply, in order to ascertain what this 
framework can tell us about labour supply, and stylised fact (b). Averaging over (14), mean 
labour supply is:
xx
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Again, log-normality of consumption has been assumed as approximation in (23). 
Accordingly we have:  
 
Proposition 5: On labour supply  
(a) Mean labour supply rises with the average status effect (a measure of average 
motivation/ambition);  
(b) The effect of variance is unclear as it is the synthesis of the differential status effect (1), 
the effect of variance on the status motive (2), and the Jensen inequality effect related to 
redistribution. Under the maintained hypothesis of 2<0, in the case of gains (1>0), the 
effect is clearly negative. Hence, more unequal societies motivated by the pursuit of a 
dream will tend to work harder. But in the more empirically plausible case of pains 
(1<0), the relation between labour supply and inequality is ambiguous.  
 
Proof: Straightforward observation of (23).      
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Again, from the point of view of reconciling theory and evidence, and following on from the 
discussion of Figure 3, the average status effect has a stronger effect on the labour supply than 
productivity (whose effect only comes through indirectly, via growth and possibly variance). 
In other words, any differences across countries or time in status will manifest themselves 
relatively more in labour supply than growth relative to equivalent differences in productivity. 
Hence, since the evidence shows more cross-country and inter-temporal variation in labour 
supply than growth, there is an indication that cultural and behavioural elements like the 
status motivation differ more across countries and possibly time. As discussed in the context 
of growth, a higher aversion towards being left behind (pains) implies more labour supply by 
a greater mass of individuals. An anomaly here is the possibly negative partial correlation 
between inequality and labour supply, reinforced in particular when we have gains from 
status and a stronger redistribution. We observe a higher inequality and a higher labour supply 
in the US with its can do, and therefore gains, culture, whereas the predictions of the above 
formula are ambiguous. A further complicating factor is redistribution (, higher in Europe) 
which increases labour supply directly, but also decreases the variance, which has an 
ambiguous effect on labour supply.   
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The main objective of this paper is to make an exploration into the macroeconomics of status-
seeking, and analyse to what extent this aspect of a model is a fruitful area of research, 
particularly in terms of explaining a range of empirical observations. More specifically, we 
begin by surveying some stylised facts related to inequality, labour supply, and factor shares, 
not traditionally addressed by macroeconomics; we argue that various pieces of information 
point towards a picture in which these variables are changing in certain ways. Though more 
details are required for full understanding, we argue that these observations are now robust 
enough to be elevated to the status of stylised facts. Most of the subsequent paper is devoted 
to the development of an organising framework made up of a basic growth-distribution 
(canonical) model with status as an innovation. We then informally ask to what extent the 
status motivation, alongside some other features of the model, can help us to account for the 
stylised facts mentioned above.  
 
The model is otherwise a variant of the AK model with variable labour supply. Ongoing 
growth is guaranteed by production spillovers a la Romer (1986). The variance of income and 
consumption arises from heterogeneity in individual-specific productivity and also 
heterogeneity in the status motivation. We make an important distinction between the average 
and differential status motivation, the former being randomly distributed across individuals, 
the latter determining the curvature of the status function with respect to the individual‟s 
relative position. Gains from status, i.e. convexity, imply that the individual gains 
increasingly more status-related satisfaction as they move up the ladder, whereas the more 
plausible pains imply that the individual cares more in not being left behind.    
 
We then build the status motive described above into this canonical macro model. Alongside 
status, we consider redistributive taxation, market imperfections (in either product or labour 
markets), and productivity. We ask whether these factors can help us understand the stylised 
facts mentioned, related in particular to inequality, labour supply and factor shares, and their 
relation to growth. The specific aim is to examine qualitatively whether status is a better 
candidate for explanation and fruitful avenue for further investigation in relation to the other 
factors we consider.  
 
The results have been stated above in detail, so we refrain from repeating them here for 
economy of space in an already long paper. Suffice it to say that the status motive can help 
explain why we have more labour supply in the US rather than Europe while the difference in 
growth rates is not so pronounced; it can also provide fruitful suggestions as to the possible 
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root causes underlying the developments in inequality and factor shares. And, partly due to its 
rich structure, the status motive does better as an overall explanation for the reported 
empirical regularities than any of the other factors we consider. Thus, the overall conclusion 
is that status is a fruitful avenue for further macroeconomic research in its quest to analyse 
socio-macroeconomic developments like the ones reported in Section 2. Because of the 
limited (but expanding) empirical information about the precise nature of the status motive, in 
particular, applied research aiming to clarify that should be especially promising.   
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NOTES (not for publication) 
 
 
1. On the derivation of (12). The government budget constraint (5) (aggregated) yields 
CY   . The aggregate resource constraint, on the other hand, is given by: Y=C+gK (since 
there are no government expenditures).  Combining these two, together with the Euler 
equation (8) and the real interest rate (9), we get:  
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Re-arranging this, we get (12).  Obviously, <1. To get the first part of the inequality (that 
<), we develop: 
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2. On the derivation of (14). The key point is that we cannot use the aggregate resource 
constraint (Y=C+gK).  
 
Instead, we re-arrange )/)(/()1(// iiiiiii YCCCYKYC    and combine this 
with  )1)(1(/)(/   gKY ii  to insert into (13). 
i
ii
i
C
Y
L

 )1)(1)(1( 
 . 
This readily yields (14).  
 
 
 
3.  A parametric example of the status elasticity (3) – this follows Tsoukis (2007) 
 
The literature has utilised a number of parameterisations of the status function )(f ; they 
may be nested as follows:  
 
321 )]([)()()( ,,0,,,
 tititti
C
titi XHXCCXf     
 
 0 < 0, 1, 2, 3 < 1  
 
- 1 introduces the linear-in-mean comparison utilised by Gali (1994) and others;  
- 2 shows the multiplicative-in-mean comparison (Abel, 1990); 
- 3 shows the importance of status, whereby utility depends on rank (the position on the 
cumulative distribution H(.) – Corneo and Jeanne, 2001; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004). 
 
The reference value is 
 ])1(1[)1( 1 gCCCC tttt     
with consumption without the agent-specific subscript i being the mean, 0<<1 
parameterising the keeping up portion and 1- the catching up portion of the Joneses/status 
effect, and g being the growth rate. The last equality occurs in the steady state.  
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Tsoukis (2007) derives the elasticity parameters 0 and 1 arising from each of the nested 
specifications. Specific cases include: 
- In the additive case (1>0, 2=3=0), the elasticity is  
-  
11
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- in which case we shall have sgn{1} < 0; we may also hypothesise sgn{2}<0 on the 
previous reasoning. In other words, this specification only allows for a pains-dominated 
differential status effect.  
- We also see that the growth rate interacts with relative position, in particular the 
differential status effect 1; specifically, we have 1/g<0 with 1<0. The interpretation 
here is that higher growth intensifies the urgency of (the less capable) agents not to be left 
behind.  
- Multiplicative comparison only (2>0, 1=3=0). In this case i will be constant (=0
i
=2). 
In this case, there are no differential status effects of any sign.  
- Rank comparison only (3>0, 1=2=0). In this case,  will be constant, providing income 
distribution takes the form H(X)=X

, as in Corneo and Jeanne (2001). But this functional 
form does not correspond to any of the benchmark distributions, nor is it a form that has 
been used in empirical studies of income distribution in particular.  
- The general case involves a mixture of all these effects. 
 
The main points are that pains (1<0) may be the more prevalent form of the differential 
status effect, though gains must not be entirely precluded a priori; and that this phenomenon 
may be intensified under conditions of higher growth.  
 
3. Comparative statics of the system (14)-(15) can be re-written as (formal proof of the 
intuitive moves given in Figure 3).  
 
From (14)-(15), we have: 
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From these, we can establish: 
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where subscripts are dropped, and where: 
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Thus, the final reduced forms are: 
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From these, it immediately follows that that all effects affect the two variables in the same 
direction (i.e., for each change considered, not across changes). But the size of the effects are 
unequal, as noted: An increase in the status motive is felt mostly on labour supply; that of an 
improvement in productivity mostly on growth; that of taxes mostly on growth, and that of 
monopoly power mostly on labour supply.  
Noting that <1, the (steady-state) comparative statics mentioned in the main text are 
verified.  
  
 
                                                          
Endnotes 
 
 
i
 This idea is sometimes referred to as negatively interdependent preferences (Boskin and 
Sheshinski, 1978; Ok and Kockesen, 2000). However, one may be argue that this is not 
appropriate as preferences depend on mean consumption; thus, while the outcomes of 
preferences are interdependent preferences themselves are not. Below, we refer to this effect 
interchangeably as the keeping up with the Joneses effect and the status effect.  
ii
 Abel (1990) puts in sharp relief the analogy between keeping up with the Joneses and habit 
formation (Constantinides, 1990). In both cases, the consumer compares their level of 
consumption with some reference level; under habit formation, the reference is made up of 
own past consumption, while under keeping up the reference is made up of others‟ 
consumption.  
iii
 The interested reader is referred to the above reviews and the helpful discussion in Clark 
and Oswald (1998) for references. 
iv
 More generally, comparisons can be to a variety of standards, quite possibly internal as 
much as external: past situation and habits, aspirations, needs and ideals, as well as norms, 
and other people‟s achievements. So, as Senik (2007) stresses, the framework of comparisons 
is very flexible. In particular, our analysis does not preclude the possibility that comparisons 
to internally-set benchmarks ( habits) is equally, or even more, important. Also, Tournemaine 
and Tsoukis (2008, 2009) argue that such keeping up or status motivation, can be manifested 
with regard to wealth or even jobs (status jobs). Our analysis would be complementary to 
those possibilities.  
v
 Interestingly, Caporale et al. (2008) find evidence of a tunnel effect for Eastern Europe, 
whereby reference income enhances happiness, rather than decreasing it; this is probably 
because it provides information about future living standards of the individuals concerned.  
vi
 It is also not entirely clear to whom individuals compare themselves to (see Senik, 2007). In 
common with much macroeconomics literature, we assume that individuals compare 
themselves with general society.  
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vii
 Because of the emphasis on placing the economic agent in a social context (e.g., by 
considering such issues as social comparison and status) and on issues of wider social concern 
(e.g., distribution), the related branch of literature may be termed socio-macroeconomics. We 
return to this point in the Conclusions. But because of the long-term nature of this analysis, 
business cycles considerations are omitted.  
viii
 Public concern about this is reflected in writings in the popular press like Guardian (2004, 
2006).  
ix
 Accordingly, comparisons in a linear distance form may be represented as 
1
,, )/(1),(
 CCaCCf titti , with 0<a<1, while the ratio, or relative distance, form can be 
represented  
a
titti CCCCf
 )/(),( ,, , with 0<a<1. 
x
 Clark and Oswald (1998, footnote 7) make explicit the analogy between concavity of the 
)(f  function (pains) and risk aversion. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) analyse the concept 
of loss aversion in the context of riskless choice, much as the )(f  function evaluates 
riskless outcomes. In this respect, the results of Dynan and Ravina (2007) are a dissonant 
voice, in that they seem to show that comparisons are important for those above the external 
reference value. But the bulk of both theoretical argument and empirical evidence favours the 
assumption stated in the text. 
xi
 Whether this finding represents a genuine inclusion of inequality in the utility function or 
whether it is the effect of less social mobility in Europe, as Alesina et al. (2004) argue, is a 
moot point and a less central one from our point of view. Whether because of idealism or 
because they feel they cannot catch up, people will be hurt by inequality.  
xii
 See also Tsoukis (2007, Section 3.1).  
xiii
 To see this more clearly, note that Ci,t/Ct-1 can be written in the steady state as (1+g)Ci,t/Ct, 
where g is defined as the growth rate of consumption. Thus, growth appears to enhance the 
feelings of status, though in the steady state all individual consumptions grow at the same 
rate, so relative standing does not depend on the growth rate. The existence of this kind of 
status illusion may well be supported along arguments that support the existence of money 
illusion (see Akerlof and Shiller, 2009). 
xiv
 In fact, the budget constraint will be balanced in the steady state, but not necessarily in 
transition. This is because we shall fix  as a constant, consistent with first order conditions in 
the steady state (as this will be our focus). However, the possibility of an unbalanced budget 
during transition will be inconsequential because the debt or assets thus accumulated will be 
finite, and, appropriately discounted, will not violate the relevant transversality (no Ponzi 
game) condition.   
xv
 The firm‟s monopoly power also potentially decreases the real interest rate from its 
competitive level, the marginal product of capital. However, this effect is not included here as 
financial firms may, to a rough approximation, be thought of as equally monopolistic as 
product firms; thus, the monopoly power is equal on both sides of the financial market and 
balances out. Strictly speaking, the correct interpretation of the index  is firm‟s relative 
monopoly power in the product market compared to the power that the firm enjoys in 
financial markets. We maintain the case of >0 as more plausible. 
xvi
 If we write the worker‟s utility as U=U(C, L)=logC-L, subject to the constraint C=WL, in 
obvious notation, with W=(1-)MPL, then, the demand for labour is given implicitly by 
firm‟s optimisation by W=(1-)L-1, and the supply is given by the individual‟s FOC: W/C=, 
so that L=1/. Hence, equation (7) appears as a combination of the two. A rise in firm‟s 
monopoly power reduces both equilibrium employment and wage, while a rise in workers‟ 
power raises the wage and reduces employment. The former is (more or less) equivalent with 
a rise in , the latter with a rise in . 
xvii
 Additional effects of status on growth arise if one generalises the utility function to let 
status depend on the ratio of individual-to-average wealth, as in Tournemaine and Tsoukis 
(2008). 
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xviii
 More precisely, this change rotates the schedules around the origin in the manner shown. 
The same is true of all the changes considered. With this in mind, we use rather liberally the 
word shift.  
xix
 This is valid under log-normality of XK, otherwise it holds as an approximation.  
xx
 Again, use is made of the log-normality of Xi, by which E(Xi)=exp{Exi+
2
x/2}. Since 
E(Xi)=1, we have Exi=-
2
x/2. We also have, E(1/Xi)=exp{-Exi+
2
x/2}, therefore 
E(1/Xi)=exp{
2
x}. 
